Now, that commitment to minimize the country’s foreign-exchange debt appears to be fading. India is taking on systemic risks as it loads up on US dollars borrowed at commercial interest rates. That’s a recipe for a balance-of-payments squeeze years down the line, and potentially even a run on the currency. The country isn’t generating enough durable foreign-exchange earnings to comfortably absorb a surge in external debt.
This isn’t some well-considered strategic shift. It’s a knee-jerk response to rupee depreciation and artificially boosts reserves. Borrowed money may make the central bank’s balance sheet look stronger, but it can’t provide a sustainable defense of the rupee or improve the ability of the nation’s borrowers to repay foreign debt. This mismatch is exactly the vulnerability currency speculators live to exploit.
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Historically, New Delhi has relied on citizens living abroad to bridge foreign-exchange shortages. This year, for instance, banks raised $133 billion through a diaspora deposit program. For the Reserve Bank of India, this is a relatively safer source of dollars: Its own people may be more willing than foreign investors to roll over their deposits in the event of an external funding crunch.
But the RBI went further, introducing incentives to encourage banks, financial institutions and public-sector companies to raise dollars in overseas capital markets. The swap facilities effectively shifted the currency risk on the principal from borrowers to the central bank. The result was a surge in issuance: More than $40 billion has been raised so far this year, a record and nearly three times the total for 2025. Banks accounted for the bulk of the issuance and were, therefore, the biggest beneficiaries of this protection. It’s a precarious strategy that India would be wise to reconsider — international capital markets are unlikely to show the same forbearance as Indians living abroad.
The dollars raised may not finance activities that earn foreign currency; banks could instead convert them into rupee loans, leaving dollar liabilities backed by rupee-denominated assets and income. If the rupee weakens sharply over the next three to five years, the RBI may have to draw on its reserves or buy dollars to meet its swap obligations, potentially adding pressure when oil prices are high or export earnings are weak. Compounding the risk, if swap and bond repayments come due around the same time, markets could anticipate heavy dollar demand and speculate against the currency.
BloombergThe country boasts one of the world’s largest foreign-exchange reserves, at $717 billion, though that’s down from a peak of $786 billion. But the headline number can be deceiving. Imagine boosting your savings account with a personal loan — the balance looks bigger, but you aren’t any richer. In fact, you’re sinking deeper into debt. That’s what is happening with India’s reserves.
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For years, the RBI has bought dollars in the market to build its reserves partly because the country doesn’t earn enough dollars through trade, unlike China which earns far more foreign currency than it spends. That adds rupees to the economy, but can also potentially fuel inflation or force the central bank to withdraw money from the banking system to avoid too much money supply.
The frenetic pace at which the RBI is adding borrowed money to its reserves leaves it facing future obligations that will ultimately drain those same coffers. It not only exposes the central bank to currency risk, but is also poor reserve management: a reckless pursuit of short-term dollar flows to arrest a rupee selloff, while ignoring the longer-term pitfalls.
It’s not the first time. In July 2019, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s administration considered something no Indian government had before: issuing foreign-currency sovereign bonds in international markets. The proposal was buried after a groundswell of criticism. But the episode showed how the government can reach for quick fixes when financial pressures mount, even though it had long avoided such borrowing and its exchange-rate risks.
India became wary of foreign-currency debt after a balance-of-payments crisis in 1991, when reserves dwindled to barely enough to cover a few weeks of imports. The government had to pledge gold overseas to secure emergency financing. The episode shaped a lasting policy aversion to dollar borrowing and introduced tight regulation on overseas debt raised by Indian companies and banks, particularly short-term liabilities that could become difficult to repay when capital flows dried up.
It must turn conservative again. It lacks the external earnings and protection from shocks such as oil-price spikes to sustain a large dollar-borrowing footprint. What looks like foreign-exchange inflows today could soon become a cascade of liabilities.
The central bank should resist using borrowed reserves to defend the rupee, which trades a short-term currency problem for a longer-term dollar squeeze. It should spread its repayment obligations over time and promote more durable inflows from exports and foreign direct investment.
The dollar is almighty. But it can be a Faustian bargain for countries that borrow it instead of earning it. The good times last until the Devil comes to collect.
