In winning the presidential run-off vote this past Sunday, Recep Tayyip Erdogan retained his grip on Turkish politics despite 20 years at the helm. Erdogan secured more than 52% of the votes against the opposition candidate Kemal Kilicdaroglu. The election was pitched by the opposition as the last stand for Turkish democracy. Many neutral observers have critiqued Erdogan as an autocrat who had massively deviated from modern Turkiye’s parliamentary and secular founding principles. Over the last two decades, Erdogan’s imprint on almost all vital Turkish institutions has deepened. His critics have likened him to a modern-day Ottoman sultan.
Makings of Erdoganism
So, why did he win? Erdogan remains popular in Turkiye’s rural areas and among Turkish neo-middle classes. This, combined with Erdogan’s and his AK Party’s institutional hegemony, gives the incumbent a huge advantage. That’s why even though no one’s really questioning the election process, the opposition has called the election unfair.
“First of all, there has been unfair competition. There was no coverage of the opposition in the state media. Manipulation was done through staged videos by putting the opposition leader and terrorists in the same movie. There were also many irregular votes cast in the elections,” says Aydin Sezer, a former Turkish diplomat and political analyst. “However, it would not be correct to say that the opposition lost the elections on these grounds. The opposition believed that the economic crisis in the country would make Erdogan lose. But the economic crisis was not the priority of the people. People now believe in Erdogan for no reason. An ideology like ‘Erdoganism’ has started to emerge in Turkiye.”
Bending the institutions
‘Erdoganism’ has been constructed brick-by-brick over the last two decades. As a result, many contend that Turkiye today finds itself transformed into an electoral autocracy. A pivotal moment in this transition came in 2007 when the Turkish military’s General Staff made it clear that it did not want AK Party’s candidate for president because of his Islamist background. But Erdogan refused to back down.
In the midst of this standoff with the military, Istanbul police uncovered an alleged plan to overthrow Erdogan’s government. In what came to be known as the Ergenekon case, Erdogan’s investigators promised to root out Turkiye’s “deep state” supposedly composed of military, intelligence and police officials aided by journalists, academics and businessmen.
One man looms large
This then led to the Sledgehammer investigations that targeted a large number of senior Turkish military commanders. Meanwhile, in 2008 Turkiye’s Constitutional Court decided against banning the AK Party in a case brought against it for undermining Turkiye’s secular principles. It was a close call. And perhaps to prevent such close calls, Erdogan went on to reform the judiciary and amend the Turkish constitution.
The Ergenekon and Sledgehammer investigations and so-called judicial reforms undermined two of Turkiye’s key institutions – the military and courts – and enabled Erdogan to install loyalists in positions of power. Add to this AK Party’s pressure on Turkish companies to purchase media properties that could be counted on to consistently put out positive coverage of Erdogan and his government policies.
“The secret to Erdogan’s electoral success is his high vote share from rural areas of Turkiye,” says Gokhan Cinkara, political analyst with Turkiye’s Necmettin Erbakan University. “He has managed to secure the votes of the nationalist and conservative electorate.” With another term, Erdogan’s institutional advantages will become even bigger, and the job for the opposition, even tougher.
Makings of Erdoganism
So, why did he win? Erdogan remains popular in Turkiye’s rural areas and among Turkish neo-middle classes. This, combined with Erdogan’s and his AK Party’s institutional hegemony, gives the incumbent a huge advantage. That’s why even though no one’s really questioning the election process, the opposition has called the election unfair.
“First of all, there has been unfair competition. There was no coverage of the opposition in the state media. Manipulation was done through staged videos by putting the opposition leader and terrorists in the same movie. There were also many irregular votes cast in the elections,” says Aydin Sezer, a former Turkish diplomat and political analyst. “However, it would not be correct to say that the opposition lost the elections on these grounds. The opposition believed that the economic crisis in the country would make Erdogan lose. But the economic crisis was not the priority of the people. People now believe in Erdogan for no reason. An ideology like ‘Erdoganism’ has started to emerge in Turkiye.”
Bending the institutions
‘Erdoganism’ has been constructed brick-by-brick over the last two decades. As a result, many contend that Turkiye today finds itself transformed into an electoral autocracy. A pivotal moment in this transition came in 2007 when the Turkish military’s General Staff made it clear that it did not want AK Party’s candidate for president because of his Islamist background. But Erdogan refused to back down.
In the midst of this standoff with the military, Istanbul police uncovered an alleged plan to overthrow Erdogan’s government. In what came to be known as the Ergenekon case, Erdogan’s investigators promised to root out Turkiye’s “deep state” supposedly composed of military, intelligence and police officials aided by journalists, academics and businessmen.
One man looms large
This then led to the Sledgehammer investigations that targeted a large number of senior Turkish military commanders. Meanwhile, in 2008 Turkiye’s Constitutional Court decided against banning the AK Party in a case brought against it for undermining Turkiye’s secular principles. It was a close call. And perhaps to prevent such close calls, Erdogan went on to reform the judiciary and amend the Turkish constitution.
The Ergenekon and Sledgehammer investigations and so-called judicial reforms undermined two of Turkiye’s key institutions – the military and courts – and enabled Erdogan to install loyalists in positions of power. Add to this AK Party’s pressure on Turkish companies to purchase media properties that could be counted on to consistently put out positive coverage of Erdogan and his government policies.
“The secret to Erdogan’s electoral success is his high vote share from rural areas of Turkiye,” says Gokhan Cinkara, political analyst with Turkiye’s Necmettin Erbakan University. “He has managed to secure the votes of the nationalist and conservative electorate.” With another term, Erdogan’s institutional advantages will become even bigger, and the job for the opposition, even tougher.